Regime change refers to the use of covert or overt policies to interfere with a nation-state’s government in order to remove or replace it. This interference can include backing a coup, providing support for a group that intends to overthrow the regime or even overtly intervening militarily. Regardless of the form, regime change policies represent a significant departure from the presumption of Westphalian sovereignty that dictates that what happens within a country’s borders is the sole responsibility of the people living there.
Advocates of regime change argue that a foreign government that commits atrocities against its people or otherwise does not serve America’s interest should be removed in favor of a more pro-American leadership. This is a flawed argument. A nation’s polity determines its own priorities and changing the existing leadership is unlikely to alter these priorities in ways that benefit America.
This article examines the role that citizen heterogeneity plays in the probability of regime change and the extent to which a revolution succeeds. In a simple model where citizens observe the state with private information and perfect coordination is impossible, we show that the presence of heterogeneity reduces the likelihood of regime change and the depth of the revolutionary coalition (the fraction of the population participating in anti-regime activities). The heterogeneity arises from exogenous characteristics such as varying levels of ideological convictions and income. The leader must carefully screen potential participants and provide rewards accordingly in order to maximize the probability of regime change.